The draft IRP C easily portable, superficial and totally dangerous-


Following a thoroughly discredited first try (IRP1) by the South African Department of Energy (DoE) in 2016, a decent version of the national Incorporated Resource Plan for electric power for the next 20 years C the particular so-called IRP2016-2030 C was promulgated by the DoE during March 2016, based on do the job done in 2016 and 2016.

This IRP must then have been up to date annually (or at minimum, every two years) by way of the DoE, based on new economic data, revised technological know-how costs, actual electrical energy demand growth in prior years, and a edited electricity demand prediction for the subsequent decades ahead.

A Draft IRP2016 as an update to IRP2016-2030 has been prepared and publicized in 2016 by the DoE, however for various reasons it had been never accepted because of the Cabinet or Governing administration. It has been widely reported that this was since the Draft IRP2016 recommended a lower life expectancy and delayed nuclear new-build for South Africa.

Lightweight plus superficial

Against this background, the most recent update to IRP2016-2030, regarded now as the Draft IRP2016, has been eagerly expected while concerns attached at the repeated gaps and extensions for the date of relieve of the Draft by way of the DoE. ?

However, after it was finally published for consumer comment in the Governing administration Gazette on November Twenty-five 2016, one of the first things that any kind of informed reader would notice in looking the Draft IRP2016, is that it is both light in weight and superficial in comparison with the substantial IRP2016-2030 in addition to Draft IRP2016 documents.

A quantity of the Appendices referred around Section 7 on the gazetted Draft IRP2016 dated July 2016 are missing, along with contrary to what is claimed on page 18, are not readily available on the DoE site. The missing Appendices 8.3, 7.Four and 7.5 involve: substantiation of the technologies learning rates presumed; the presentation for the discount rate suspected; and the report on all other assumptions made in any Draft IRP2016.

Within days, a new revised Draft IRP2016 Revision 1 dated The fall of 2016 was published around the DoE website in which most references to the higher than missing Appendices have now been removed. In addition, your gazetted Draft IRP2016, and its Review 1 on the DoE web-site, contain a number of further important errors, variance and omissions, as in-depth below.

Erroneous and disagreeing technology costs used

One in the major areas of mistake, inconsistency and omission in the Draw up IRP2016 is that of the technology prices used.

In the first illustration, the Draft IRP2016 reports that the costs involving generic technologies applied are based on a previously solution, updated EPRI report out of date August 2016, provided as a result of Eskom as a member of EPRI, that was finally released with September 2016 and has recently been declassified.

However, in the above EPRI survey, the critical atomic, solar PV and wind power technology costs shown bear no likeness to all known, up-to-date, levelised costs of electricity (LCOE) data and contracted charges for new nuclear, photovoltaic and wind strength in South Africa.

The pace of exchange utilized in the EPRI report plus the Draft IRP2016 to establish the LCOE for new nuclear, can be stated as $1,00 = R11,55 that is certainly an out-of-date exchange level applicable to Thinking about receiving 2016.

The DoE is being disingenuous and very wrong when it says on page 10 during the Draft IRP2016 Revision A person that: “This does not have an effect on the results as this is the comparative analysis and all options are impacted every bit as.”

The latest LCOE calculation thorough nuclear by the CSIR Strength Centre as with April 20161 shows essentially the most optimistic “IPP PPA tariff equivalent” for first time nuclear in South Africa to be R1,17/kWh.

The LCOE figure connected with R0,97/kWh used in the Version IRP 2016 is thus quite definitely lower than the most constructive CSIR figure of R1,17/kWh, a lot more realistic R1,30 for you to R1,52/kWh in a recent EE Site owners study, or the stats of R1,50 that will R1,83/kWh provided in the current EPRI report dated July 2016.2

While the Draft IRP2016 states that a “hybrid cost is employed for nuclear technology depending on the study commissioned from the DoE Nuclear Branch”, no further details are given, no reference is provided. Apparently this study remains technique.

Of course, for atomic power, the Set up IRP2016 conveniently ignores the expense of mid-life refurbishment, decommissioning plus long-term storage and disposable of high-level radioactive waste, while for coal-fired power, this ignores the existing environmentally friendly levy, the awaiting carbon tax, in addition to considerable other externalities much like the cost of negative wellbeing impacts.?

The price groundwork used in the Set up IRP2016 for solar PV from R0,93/kWh and wind for R0,81/kWh are said to be according to REIPPP bid Window Four prices as at January 2016, and to rule out owner’s development fees and shallow conventional connection costs. Having said that, the CSIR Energy Center has presented current costs based on the put money the Window 4 Quick Round for both solar PV and wind during R0,62/kWh (already adjusted to April 2016 rands, and together with owners development charges and shallow power company connection costs).

Thus you will find something seriously amiss while using the solar PV and the wind power costs which might be used by the DoE in the Draft IRP2016, as well as the ludicrous LCOE figures for tool scale solar PV (higher than R2,00/kWh) and wind (by R1,04 to R2,20/kWh) that are given for South Africa while in the EPRI report provided via Eskom.

There is also something certainly amiss and irregular with the relative expenditures used in the Produce IRP2016 for coal, nuclear, solar PV and blowing wind power, with the expenditures of wind and solar Photo voltaic used being appreciably too high with respect to the charges of nuclear in addition to coal.

However, credit ought to at least be given into the DoE for realising the EPRI numbers for atomic, solar PV and wind flow power, are completely from the mark, and for not using them.

Base-case and standard planning methodology disregards recommendations of MACE

The base-case shown in the Draft IRP2016 statement not only uses obviously erroneous and unpredictable technology costs (while detailed above), and also imposes completely arbitrary and artificial limits on the delivery associated with renewable energy, namely 1000 MW/year for solar PV, plus 1600 MW/year for breeze power, with absolutely no justification, other than that exactly the same (equally arbitrary) difficulties were provided in 2016 in the IRP2016-2030, in a very several context.3

Furthermore, the base-case also imposes a as well as emission constraint to your years ahead in order to 2050, this being the “moderate peak-plateau-decline” carbon emission velocity.

This approach completely ignores the formal suggestion by the Ministerial Advisory Council upon Energy (MACE)4, which motivated the minister additionally, the DoE that the correct planning approach would be to get started with an unconstrained, least-cost, base-case scenario, using correct and up-to-date technological know-how costs, to establish a associated least-cost, unconstrained, base-case technology blend to 2050, along with the associated cost of the following base-case scenario. MACE also suggested that the Draft IRP2016 need to run a number of various other scenarios using many imposed constraints, to establish the relevant energy fuses calculated by the IRP model for each of these alternate scenarios, together with the affiliated additional costs. Only then can the charge implications of the various demands be understood.

However, particularly if was ignored. The actual base-case presented in the Draw up IRP2016 was not the least-cost scenario, and no costing in the base-case or any of the several alternative scenarios ended up being presented.

This makes it difficult for any organisation as well as person to analyse the additional cost significance of a particular situation versus any ending up benefit or coverage objective achieved with that scenario.

Demand forecast C the advantages of flexible planning within a environment of inherent uncertainty

The electricity demand foresee used in the Version IRP2016 is based on a Demand Estimate Report prepared by a CSIR for Eskom dated Earnings 2016.

However, there is a wide spread connected with forecasted demand according to the assumptions and economical growth scenarios viewed as, and planners recognize that any electricity demand forecast today is fraught using uncertainty. The reality is that that demand forecasters essentially don’t really have any idea as to the precise long term grid-based electricity demand C truly for the next 5 years C while there are significant bothersome forces and technologies at play, both now and in the years and months ahead to 2050.5

Large-scale nuclear and big coal-fired strength generation projects are not only notorious for rather significant cost as well as time overruns, but will also commit Africa to the specific systems and vendor international locations for the next 40 so that you can 100 years. In this doubtful environment, it would be sensible to plan for mobility, and not commit South Africa to expensive together with inflexible technologies demanding mega-projects with long head times.

Eskom’s preferred predicament C more constraints to just make nuclear into the merge even earlier

It is quite apparent that the artificial limitations on solar PV and also wind capacity yearly in the Draft IRP2016 base-case is really a political decision instead of a rational planning judgement, to force 20 GW of nuclear power on the mix, even though merely from 2037 onwards.

However, any scenario punted by Eskom proceeds much further, preserving the constraints on solar PV and wind, along with pushing for an a lot more aggressive constraint for carbon emissions, after having a “carbon budget approach” rather than the a lot more “moderate peak-plateau-decline” constraint used in a base-case.

Eskom’s preferred scenario forces the IRP model to fit 25 GW of atomic power into the combine, starting in 2025. Yet together, Eskom continues to proceed featuring a massive coal-fired new-build programme, as well as plans to extend the lifespan of its existing, eco non-compliant coal fleet C the two having exceptionally large CO2 emissions. The hypocrisy involving pushing for more strict carbon emission limitations to facilitate it is nuclear ambitions beginners, while maintaining high-emission coal ability, and constraining low-emission electrical power, seems lost for Eskom.

However, this does reflect Eskom’s single-minded resolve to keep IPPs and future competitors out of the graphic, while focussing in big coal and nuclear power in an effort to retain its principal market position in a long time ahead.

The alternative with the electricity supply marketplace and Eskom, of course, is always to focus on more, scaled-down and flexible generation vegetation, with well-known and declining deployment costs, that can be constructed faster – for instance solar PV and blowing wind power in combination with mid-merit CCGT in addition to OCGT gas plant, pumped storage and other appearing energy storage alternatives for peaking capacity.

Inhibiting and restricting public participation

The Draft IRP2016 Update has been under getting ready by the DoE for more than a year now, as well as was intended to be granted for comment from a public participation method in March 2016. In the case, it was finally unveiled on November 12 2016.

But despite this long and far delayed gestation phase by the DoE, notably lost from the information given in the Draft IRP2016 released in the Government Gazette and so on the DoE website are several Appendices as mentioned previously.

Nevertheless, considerably typically, after on the IRP2016 for more than a 12 months, the first series of open public participation workshops declared by the DoE in the big metropolitan areas of South Africa, namely Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town and Slot Elizabeth, are being rushed through between 12 7 and 12 15 2016, giving stakeholders, impacted parties and the consumer little over a week to digest the knowledge provided (and to origin and digest any missing Appendices), prior to the graduation of the public hearings in the December year, well before closure with the public consultation practice in February 2017.

Furthermore, just DoE policy makers can get to see the costing of the various scenarios, including any new circumstances identified by stakeholders, affected celebrations and the public in the public participation method. This is surely contrary to the very spirit of any promulgation process through open public consultation and diamond.?

All this can only result in inhibiting and constraining meaningful public response and engagement by using relevant affected parties from the major financial centres of South Africa.


    This is based on an exchange rate of $1,Double zero = R13,40 (i personally.e. the average within the period from March 2016 to September 2016); along with an overnight capital cost of $5083/kW net output, using the lower of Rosatom’s own estimate of the in a single day cost for ten VVER1200 reactors, and including a extremely conservative estimate intended for owner’s development expenses and shallow power grip connection costs.
    The mainly PPA-based nuclear power train station in the world, Hinkley Point D in the UK, comes in at a strong agreed PPA tariff with 92,50/MWh in 2016 money, and that is roughly R1,60/kWh at current exchange rate.
    This was a student in a time when there was no renewable energy industry, utility machine solar PV or wind power plants inside South Africa, and when international solar PV and wind prices were tremendously different to what they are right now.
    MACE is a broad-based group of school, scientists, industrialists, representatives of diverse business and field associations, energy rigorous users, energy specialists and other stakeholders, announced from the Minister of Energy soon after taking office.
    These disruptors involve: rapidly rising Eskom electrical energy prices; further substantial price reductions for photovoltaic; grid-tied power supplementation; power company defection and energy switching by way of example to gas power, gas cooking and/or photo voltaic water heating; brand-new emerging domestic, industrial and utility range battery storage engineering; and the entry in the market of electric cars at scale.
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